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Not long ago it was the privilege of anthropologists to celebrate and take credit for 
weaning the concept of "culture" from the clutches of literature, philosophy, classical 
music and the fine arts--in other words, from the conceit of the Humanities. Our 
discipline's founding father initiated this emancipatory project, I believe, unbeknownst to 
himself. He rescued the concept from its joint monopoly by the opera-house on the one 
hand and the petri-dish on the other. Sir Edward Burnett Tylor proffered a definition: 
Culture or Civilization, taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. (Tylor 1878) 
For all  its unwieldiness, its omnibus character, and &spite its embeddedness in 
the evolutionary paradigm of the day to which Tylor himself paid ample homage, the 
definition generated the now famous view that culture is relative, it &fines the human 
condition, that all human beings have it, or rather that it has them, and that one human 
being's culture is no better nor worse than another's. To be fair, it was Franz Boas who, 
though never offering a definition of his own, breathed life into the implications of the 
Tylorean &finition by putting it into the practice of his craft.' Of course, I am sure he did 
not foresee the silliness into which relativism, freed of its original polemical context, was to 
degenerate a generation later. And then there was Branislow Malinowski, who, though 
* This is a modified version of a talk delivered as the Second Wertheim Lecture at the University of 
Amsterdam in the summer of 199 1. 
See George Stocking (1968). 
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never calling himself a cultural anthropologist, introduced the discipline's methodological 
sine qua mn, participant-observation. 
The Humanities, for its part, was vaguely aware of the scandal brewing in 
anthropology but, perhaps chalking it down to eccentricity (something many an English 
anthropologist and a few Americans were guilty of), it was content to continue refining the 
Arnoldian view of culture2 in practice if not in theory. 
History shared much of the prejudice of the H~manities.~ To support my 
argument with an extreme case, take, for instance, that most prestigious of think-tanks, The 
Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. It has four schools: Mathematics, Physics, 
History and the Social Sciences. At "The 'tute,"' as some of the locals call it, "History" 
means Ewopean history. kopean history is more historical, not in the sense of 
temporality but in the sense of an imputed cultural richness; "cultural," in the Amoldian 
sense. Even more to the point, historians of classical Greek and Rome are the "real 
historians" there and, by the time we get beyond the Renaissance, "History" begins to lose 
its empyrean dignity. Thus we find the only French social historian, whose work happens 
to be centered around the 18th to 19th centuries, housed in the Social Sciences. But even 
among the "less than sterling" historians who chose to write on the more recent past, the 
Arnoldian viewpoint persisted in only a slightly different form. Their histories, for the 
most part, privileged the scripted voices of the powerful and the "cultured." If this bias is 
true of European historiography, it is even truer of those working on the histories of non- 
European peoples, up to and including the very latest of historiographies, colonial history. 
Oral history, even when available, would be suspect and would most likely be relegated to 
that degenerate form, "folklore." 
See Matthew Arnold (1932). 
I owe thanks to Prof. Eric Hobsbawm and, especially, to Dr. Miri Rubin for substantive discussions of 
this and the following paragraph. The responsibility for errors in interpretation is entirely mine. 
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Speaking of European social historians, however, it is to some of these that the 
anthropological concept of culture began to make sense and in whose works its 
implications have been the most profound; more profound, I think, than in anthropology 
itself. Tylor's name was rarely invoked and the phenomenon in question was called 
"social" rather than "cultural." But as it was to subsequently become clear the sense in 
which "social" was employed was more akin to "culture" than to the concepts of "social" or 
"society" that were employed by British structural functionalists. It was "social" in the 
Durkheimian sense that was to influence the Annales School of history, especially through 
Marcel Mauss. The move beyond the history of the middle ages to the creation of a space 
- for what came to be known as Early Modern History was simultaneously the move from 
ecclesiastical history to histoire ~eriale.~ Marc Bloch's two-volume work on Feudal 
Society was to become an anthropological canon in the sixties and seventies. Culture 
found its counterpart in the longue duree of history. On the English side, history from 
- below was to find its finest embodiment in EP. Thompson's classic, Tke Making of the 
-- English Worih'ng Class. The strikingly similar influence of "culture" on European historian 
Carlo Ginzburg on the one hand, and the Americans Robert Darnton and Natalie Zemon 
Davis on the other, is remarkable. What distinguishes all these historians is their ability to 
"hear" the voices not of those who were bearers of Culture (with a capital "C"), but of 
those who found themselves embedded in culture (with a small "c"), those whose voices 
were inscribed in minuscule: the witches, the women, the shepherds, the serfs, peasants, 
the poor, the popular and the public. 
Enter Cultural Studies and its counterpart, Literary Study. Scholars in Cultural 
Study, like the anthropologists and the social historians I have referred to, began to take 
See Emmanuel L. Ladurie (1974 and 1979) 
See Fernand Braudel(1976). 
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seriously the culture of the neglected In this case it was the culture, mainly in the west, of 
the many over that of the privileged few. If the Arnoldian definition were a decanter, 
students in cultural studies chose to study and appreciate the dregs,-not the sublimate. 
Their topics of interest included, among others, the medm, film, billboard advertisements, 
reggae and rap, potters and punks, gangs and televangelists, wine, beer and cheese. 
"Culture," in Raymond Williams's words, became "ordinary." 
If Cultural Studies, paralleling Anthropology's tum away from the privileged 
west, thumbed its nose at the high, the mighty and the refined, Literary Study thumbed its 
nose at convetional literary criticism by emulating anthropology (at least some branches of 
anthropology) in emphasizing the ccmtext.in which texts are written and, more importantly, 
in which they are read. 
The story I have told thus far may sound as though all is triumphant in 
anthropology: its goals reached, its intentions vindicated. Anthropologists teach; others, 
sooner or later, learn. Alas, it is not so. Allow me to back-track a bit to Roger Keesing's 
review essay of almost twenty years ago, and in the interest of convenience recommit all 
his sins of slight--of Linton, Lowie, Kluckhon, Kroeber, White, and most regrtettably, 
Sapir. Keesing divided the culture theorists into two broad camps: the adaptationalists and 
the ideationalists. Marvin Harris and a few archaeologists were the leading spokesmen of 
the former, while the major sub-divisions among the ideationalists were headed by the 
cognitivists, the Levi-Straussian structuralists, the Schneiderian symbolists and the 
Geertzian intmpretivists. The adaptationalists de riguer, who had attempted to define 
culture as merely adaptation to economic, demographic, technological and ecological 
forces, have by now, for all practical purposes, fallen by the wayside. Human beings 
turned out to be as incorrigibly maladaptive as they were adaptive, and the way they went 
about being adaptive and maladaptive was as capricious as the proverbial weather in certain 
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temporate zones. As for the cognitivists, their early high hopes of finally making the 
_.-- 
culture concept scientific--and.that too by not having to resort to analogies from the 
physical or biological sciences but by identifying it as a system of rules along linguistic 
lines-fell faster than they rose. Brent Berlin and Paul Kay's Basic Color T e r n  (1969) 
was the last "love story" that came out of those heady days of ethnoscience. Cognitive 
anthropology survives today in a much more modest but vital f m  in the fields of 
ethnobiology cognitive psychology and similar sub-fields. S t r u c M s m ,  which, in one of 
its extensions, came paradoxically close to a kind of biologism-with the imputed binary 
structure of the mind seeking kinship with the bicameral structure of the brain, triune-brain 
notwithstanding-has been superseded by post-structuralism and postmodernism in 
intellectual circles. Schneiderian insights, articulated in increasingly confused, confusing 
and quaint astronomical terms: were both better stated and overwhelmed by Michel 
. . 
- Foucault's writings where epistemes and epochs. Schneiderian anthropology's disregard 
- for history, its essentialism, its unabashed ideatism, its hypernominalism and its absolute 
.; disregard of questions of power, rendered it parochial and largely irrelevant in the nineteen- 
eighties. It is not that Foucault was innocent of at least some of these apparent drawbacks 
but the range of his power and intellect converted them into interestingly defended a s~e t s .~  
For Geertz too, culture was symbolic. But as against Schneider, however, he played 
down the ~vstematicity of culture. He belittled the cognitivists' emphasis on the rule- 
governedness of culture. He found structuralism's commitment to u n i v d i z e  Culture and 
to locate it in the "human mind," dangerously close to biologism. (I for one am not against 
making a place for both "culturen and "culturen but am wary of structuralist construction 
See, for onstance, consider this: "It should be stressed that these concepts rest on the premise that any 
symbol has many meanings, on the premise that symbols and meanings can be clustered into galaxies, and 
on the premise that galaxies seem to have core or epitomizing symbols as their foci; " or this: "I am now 
dealing with a galaxy [American Culture] in which coitus is the epitomizing symbol." David Schneider 
(1976: 218 & 216 respectively). 
See, in particular, Michel Foucault (1972, 1973 and 1980). 
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of it.) As against all these co-ideationalists (if we accept Keesing's label in this regard), 
Geertz was committed to taking "culture" from out of the private, especially from within 
people's minds or heads, and recognizing it as public. And then there is the persistent 
presence of Geertz's prose style in his brand of interpretive anthropology. This, more than 
any other single factor-more even than the Weberian and Diltheyan roots of his interpretive 
anthropology--I believe is responsible for the wide appeal his writings have had, especially 
in the Humanities. What is of lasting significance in this aspect of Geertz's work is the 
unapologetic incorporation of the ethnographer with and in the ethnography. Once, when 
asked about ethnographic objectivity by one who still believed that there was an 
objective/scientific prose, Geertz replied, "I don't want anyone to mistake any of my 
sentences as having being written by anyone else but by me."* Every line bore his 
signature, so to speak. Thus "culturen was no longer something out there to be discovered, 
described and explained, but rather something into which the ethnographer, as interpreter, 
entered "Self indulgence,! " cried the traditionalists. "Not enough reflexivity,! " cried the 
new reflexivists. But culture had become dialogic, less in the much heralded Bakhtinian 
sense but more in the lesser known Peircean sense, a sense in which the consequences of 
conversation is shot through with --that rhyming word--"ty~hasm."~ Tychasm is that 
element of chance contained in the ''play of musement," --a free kind of doing, much like 
Lord Siva's leelas ' "mindless" eroticisms and asceticisms, acts of wanton love and wonton 
war, and the cosmic dance that spans it all-that is more fundamental than the gentle 
persuation of agapism and the mechanistic necessaity of anamasm. 
It is dialogic aspect of culture, culture not as a given but as something made 
or, rather, coaeated anew by anthropologist and informant in a "conversation," which I in 
Overheard from a conversation between Geertz and this other scholar during which I was present. 
9 One of C.S. Peirce's several neologisms which he triangulates with anaucasm (the force of mechanical 
necessity) and agapism (loving lawfullness/mindfulness) See C.S. Peirce 6:302. 
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my own work attempted to elaborate (1984). I argued for a conversation in which what 
was generated, exchanged and transformed consisted not only of words but the world of 
non-verbal signs as well, not only of symbols--those arbitrary or conventional signs-but 
also of icons and indexes and a whole array of other, more or less motivated, signs. Built 
into such a semeiotic conceptualization of culture is an argument against a certain kind of 
essentialism. Given the silliness of some of the forms of relativism that are on the prowl in 
anthropologyland and beyond, it behooves me to stress that the anti-essentialism I advocate 
is not directed at what is essentially human-a debatable and refinable list which should 
, , include, besides language, a sense of dignity, a need to love and be loved, the capacity to 
- reason, the ability to laugh and to cry, be sad and be happy. My antiessentialism is 
directed against those who advocate essential differences between and among cultures, or 
rather, against those who believe that the differences are essential and more or less 
everlasting.1° The Schneiderians are most guilty of this kind of essentialism. Their 
position may best be described as essential relativism, which is fundamentally irrational and 
.; immoral--a charge I don't have the time to explicate, but which will become clear to anyone 
who ponders a little on the moral implications of such a position. What I envisage is a 
dynamic relativism which does not essentialize differences but believes in the essential 
humanity of humankind, a humanity that is not merely biological but Cultural (with a new 
kind of capital "C"). Most cultural anthropologists, in focusing their accounts on culture 
with a small "c", have been guilty of neglecting, even if not denying, the importance of this 
kind of "Culture." 
At this point allow me to interject what appears to be a radical critique of such a 
semeiotic view of culture. The charge is that the governing metaphor in such a view, 
lo If the essentialist treatmmtsof cultures are wanting and deserving of inknogation, so do comparable 
treatments of "class" and " gender." In this regard, see Joan Scott 1988:Part II but also the back and forth 
between Scott Laura Lee Downs (1993). 
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"conversation," exalts consensus at the expense of contestation. One response to this 
charge is an elementary one. "Conversation" entails communication or even communion in 
the widest sense of those terms, a sense that includes agreements and disagreements, 
consensus as well as contestation; but on shared grounds. Such a defense is neither very 
ingenious nor thoroughly ingenuous. For it is true that most cultural accounts in 
anthropology have given scant attention to contestations, even if they were only a subset of 
a larger consensual matrix. Yet, the "contestators" must concede the argument in principle. 
But the critique in question suffers from a more serious infirmity. It suffers from what we 
may, following Hobbes, diagnose as "bagpipitis," "a going along with the prevailing 
windy cant, with whatever passes for [radical] aflams, m m i n g ]  indistinguishable from 
the tamest of biemeance. "(G. Hill, p. 17). Contestation itself has become a clich6, a call to 
combat with phrases "on tap," an obliging mannerism, part of a higher order consensus. 
Both, consensualists and contestators sleep in the same bed of complaisance. 
Furthermore, regardless of whether we see ourselves as consensus theorists or as 
contestory types, and even as we concede that we are culture co-making processualists 
rather than culture-finding essentialists, we cannot afford to be unaware of our collective 
logocentric inclinations, our privileging of language over labor, words over acts. True, the 
culture-making that the ethnographer or the poet engages in parallels the culture-making of 
the artisan and the farmer. Both are engaged in trimming or cutting the over-luxuriant and 
in coaxing the stubbornly unproductive to yield. And in both domains, there are the 
craftsmen and the hacks, both of whom have a bearing on the production of culture. The 
significant divide, however, is--not between the consensus theorists and the contestatory 
ones but--between those who privilege the word--a group to which .most academic scholars 
belong-and those who privilege the deed I introduce the deed here in order to facilitate 
our movement to culture's edge, to what I shall call, its counterpoint. Words are symbols, 
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which even at the edges, pull one towards culture's center. Deeds, even when culturally 
centered,--"habitusn notwithstanding-threaten to push against culture's limits. The deed I 
shall employ for making this point clear is the act of violence. But fitst I must return to my 
story about the cultumconcept.. 
This brief diversion, apart from other matters, was also intended to make the 
caveat about essentialism clearer. What then do we have? A series of paired terms: culture 
as given and culture as emergent, culture as reality and culture as realizing, culture as 
essentially relative and culture as relatively (and dynamically) essential. The second in each 
.- .- of these paired terms could hold its own, even if only by means of various adjustments and 
. .- 
:+" equivocations. The first would falter. But for those of us who advocate the second set of 
* 
S-T terms and thereby think that we are on the winning side, it is too early to gloat. There is a 
worm in the apple, a bomb in the banana. 
:.T. The problem lies at the core of the culture concept itself. The problem lies in what 
?!: Tylor called "that complex whole." For the essentialists, the whole is an existent, a done 
x - thing, a thing of the past. For the processualists, "the whole" is something towards which 
the c u l t u r e - e s  and culture-seekers move. It lies in the future. The movement is 
toward this realizable entity, a foretaste of which is provided in what the hermeneutician 
calls "understanding." The dialectic is what guides one toward it. In other words, there is 
a teleology to the cultural process. You and I may not live long enough to see its 
completion, its swnmwn boluun, but it is moving toward such an end, however long that 
end may be deferred. It is this logic and this faith upon which culture, emergent, dynamic 
and processual, is built. 
Regardless of the difference, both ideas of "culturew--culture as essence and 
culture as process--partake of a Kantian cum Hegelian project. With respect to Kant, I 
have in mind the implications of his Critique of Aesthaic Judgernem, whereby we are 
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invited to see the beautiful as the sublime,ll and wherein when we contemplate an object 
and find it beautiful, there is a certain harmony between the imagination and the 
understanding which leads us to an immediate delight in that object. That whole which we 
call culture is supposed to end up, in anthropological analysis, to have a certain harmony, 
not unlike the Kantian object of beauty. If we can only make it true, then we will also have 
made it beautiful. Or is it the other way around? In our monographs, how much time do 
we spend "rounding it all up," especially through the crafting of a closing statement or 
conclusion? This ideal is most poignantly captured in W.B. Yeats's description of a 
poem's reaching this moment of the sublime in a letter of September 1936, to Dorothy 
Wellesley: "a poem comes right with a click like a closing box." So would we like our 
cultural accounts, our monographs, our arguments, to end in a moment of beautiful 
finality. 
Ah beauty! For John Keats, "the aesthetic impulse is encapsulated in the coldness 
and sterility of his Grecian Urn" (Steven Shaviro 1990: 10). The point is made even better 
yet by Shaviro's reading of that marvellous poem by Emily Dickinson. First the poem: 
I died for Beauty--but was scarce 
Adjusted in the Tomb 
When one who died for Truth, was lain 
In an adjoining room-- 
He questioned softly, "Why I failed"? 
"For Beauty," I replied-- 
"And I--for Truth-Themself are One-- 
We Brethren, aren, He said-- 
And so, as Kinsmen, met a Night-- 
We talked between the Rooms-- 
Until the Moss had reached our lips-- 
And covered up--our names-- 
Now to Shaviro's interpretation: 
As far as the interedng distinction that Kantr draws between the beautiful and the sublime, and in so 
far as he aligns the former with woman and the latter with man, it is but one step away from the Hindu 




It is only insofar as they are ironically "Adjusted in the Tomb," assigned their 
fixed boundaries under the power of death, that beauty and truth are one. "I died 
for beauty": does this mean that the speaker and her interlocutor died for the sake 
of beauty and truth (as martyr or witness)? Or, more perversely, did they choose 
to die in order thar they might thereby attain truth and beauty? A desire for death is 
perhaps the hidden tebs of beauty and truth (1990:ll). 
The desire to find culture, either as a present reality or as a d e f d  ideal, to find it 
in any case, as a coherent whole, true and beautiful, is the desire to find a corpse. The 
work of culture becomes the "lifeless residue in which the process of creation is lost" the 
spark of tychasm is denied (Shaviro 1990: 10) 
L'. . At The same moral is conveyed in a well known folktale in South Asia. It probably 
has a common Indo-European origin. There was once a young man whose quest for truth 
'.v c,, . - was insatiable. He crossed the seven seas, climbed every mountain, dared the wildest of 
jungles and traversed several deserts until he finally came to a cave where he found a 
3 - -  a\> toothless old hag, dressed in rags, with matted hair, holding a chain of beads in her gnarled 
- 
t. 
r hands with over-grown fingernails. To the young man's surprise and delight, the old 
- 
.J . . -= woman spoke. She uttered her words with caution and care, pausing to make every 
syllable true. After a spell-binding session of truth-hearing, the young man worshipped 
the old woman, thanked her profusely, and pleaded with her to allow him to do something 
for her in return for having so kindly and so completely slaked his thirst for truth. "Yes," 
replied this woman, this fount of all truth. "You can do me a favour. When you return to 
your people, tell them that I am beautifid; will you please?" 
You may well object, holding that all this about the sublimation of truth and beauty 
in an objectified culture may be true enough of the essentialists, but not true of the 
pmcessualists. You may even be kind enough to count me among those exempt from the 
charges in question because, in Fluid Signs, I described the fixing of culture as something 
that is forever deferred And to the heckler who might say, "but where in your book is 
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chance?" my supporters could have chanted, "passim, passim, ubique!" I might have 
gloated in agreement, had I not confronted the task of writing an ethnography, or rather, an 
anthropography of violence. So I must demur. The culture concept, even in its processual 
mode, relies on a unifying metaphysical process called the dialectic. Culture totalizes. 
Culture is the emergence of higher and increasingly more adequate agreement from less 
adequate and less developed contradictions. At a more concrete level, a level in which my 
own fieldwork in Sri Lanka on the anthropology of violence is implicated, we see this 
Hegelian hope expressed in theories of the state. A m d i n g  to this view of the world, 
there is a metaphysical process that transforms tribal life, which is primitive and 
inadequate, into the more adequate and evolved rational nation-state. But the inter-national 
and intra-national strifes of the clay and the violence they spawn has made a mockery of 
this hope. The contradictions inherent in the concept of the nation-state, constructed with 
the help of an imagined national past, demonstrate most clearly the operation of this 
exclusionary teleology. In nationalist discourse, the question is not who is a Sri Lankan or 
who is Dutch, but who is a tme Sri Lankan and who is a tme Dutch person. Mytho- 
histories are invoked to help recast and relive an idealized past which is "constantly 
undermined by current and changing realities." And it is in these very imperfections--or, 
more correctly, in the perception of these "surpluses" or "excesses" as imperfections-that 
"nationalisms find their s u m u r  and sabotage."(Daniel, Dirks and Prakash 199 1:6). 
Nationalism is a horripilation of culture in insecurity and fright; it is as much the realization 
of the power in culture as the lack thereof. In either case, culture is not power-neutral. 
All this is not to deny the successes of culture's recuperative and appeasing 
capabilities. Marx's celebrated "opiate" is only one-even if the most poignant-case in 
point. Marxism itself, like the Hegelianism it turned on its head, is another case in point. 
Call it cultural or culturoid Culture does make sense, even beauty, and sometimes, truth. 
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But its totalizing mission and capacities is what is in question And to question such 
capacities is not to invoke its opposite (whatever that may be) as the solution All of which 
brings me back to the subtitle of my essay. Is there a counterpoint to culture? 
Let me hasten to warn you, however, that the counterpoint to culture I have in mind 
must go beyond Bach and, ergo, beyond Wertheirn who metaphorized Bach in a hope- 
filled paper on social change. (1974) The counterpoint I speak of is something that resists 
incorporation into the harmony of a still higher order of sound, sense or society. It resists 
the recuperative powers of culture, it runs parallel without ever crossing the dialectic. It 
-4 resists normalization, in the Foucaultian sense of that term. 
f5-'. AUow me to indicate more clearly what I have called the counter-point of culture by 
=.- the only way I know how: by intimation, by example. The example is violence, though 
violence is not the only event that is constituted of the culturally unrecuperable surplus I 
Q-: speak of. Let me plunge into ethnography, and tell you of an event that was described to 
=c 
L4 me by two brothers. It concerns the senseless deaths of two men and the suffering of two 
?. - -- survivors. These two brothers narrowly escaped being killed by a gang of Sinhalese youth 
during the 1983 anti-Tamil riots in a northeastern village in Sri Lanba. However, they saw 
their elder brother and father being murdered12 
Selvakumar is 22 years old and works as a teller in one of the local banks. When it 
was arranged for me to interview Selvakumar on the events that led to his father's and 
brother's deaths, I was not warned that whenever he recalled these events he suffered 
episodes of loss of consciousness. The day of my interview with him was no exception. 
During our interview which lasted for over four hours, Selvakumar lost consciousness 
thrice. The first time he lost consciousness was after the first half hour of the interview, 




and it took twenty five minutes for him to recover. On the second and third occasions, he 
remained unconscious for about 10 minutes each time. During these episodes his pulse 
and temperature fell sharply, his pallor drained to an ashen gray, he responded neither to 
pin pricks nor smelling salts, and he lost control of his bladder. By Dr. Rajasingam's 
orders, a warm poultice of medicinal herbs was applied to his temples and forehead and his 
lips were moistened with tippili tea. When Selvakumar regained consciousness he did not 
remember having lost consciousness. 
What follows is a partial description of what happened on "that day," as he calls it: 
That day my father and the chairman (of the Urban Council) went to the police 
and told them that we had heard with our own ears that this Gunesene had collected 
the other boys in the s0ccer.tea.m and had obtained long knives and sticks and that 
they were planning to come and beat up all the Tamils in this housing settlement. 
This Gunesene had already served some time in jail. He is not from this a .  He 
is from Nawalapitiya, from where you come. He has been here for many years 
though. This place, this housing colony was in really bad shape when my father 
moved in. But he organized the place. He cleaned up the well, cleared the jungle, 
and cut drains for the rain water to flow. My brother. Oh, my brother they killed 
him. They killed him and I couldn't even help. I was afraid They beat him to 
death: "thuk,"thukn. (He passes out) 
(Later) : 
The police inspector told the chairman that if we had a complaint we should 
take it to the navy post. So my father and the chairman went to the navy post. The 
sentry did not let them through at first. They waited there all morning. Then the 
Commander's car came. He must have been going into town. The chairman 
waved him to a stop. They asked him if they could talk to him for a moment. The 
chairman had known him personally. "Say what you have to say. I have a lot of 
work." "Can we go into your office?" the chairman wanted to know. "There is no 
time for that," replied the commander. So my father and the Chairman told him 
what they had heard. The commander told them that they did not have any right to 
approach him on such matters and that he should have taken his complaint to the 
police station. They told him that they had already been there and the Police 
Inspector had told them to come to him (the commander). "If you are so smart, 
why don't you control your own people," said the commander to the Chairman. 
My father and the Chairman walked back to the police station. On the way, 
another friend, a Tamil, told us that some Sinhalese from Vavuniya had also joined 
Gunasene's gang and that he had heard Gunasene say to the boys not to worry, that 




We were met there by Nitthi (Selvakumar's younger brother), who came to tell 
us that all the Sinhalese taxi-c&ivers were telling the Tamil taxi-drivers that they 
were going to be killed today. There were no taxis in the Tamil taxi-stand They 
(the Sinhalese taxidrivers) had told my younger brother that the rain had delayed 
things a little, but when it stopped to be prepared for "Ilamn13. It was raining 
heavily. The inspector finally came out and said, "so what, the commander did not 
want to see the tigers?" The chairman said, "Look, you know all these boys. You 
know this man. They are good people. They have lived with the Sinhalese in 
peace. They are neither tigers nor bears. There are rowdies who are threatening to 
kill them." He said like that. The inspector laughed and said, looks like the tigers 
are afraid They have become pussy cats." The other constables joined in and 
laughed. "Why don't you go to Appapillai Amirdhalingam.14 He will take w e  of 
you. What do you say? (He was tallcing to my brother). They tell me that you are 
the big man in the area. What, are you afraid too? " My brother did not say a 
word. He just clenched his teeth and looked down and walked away. All the 
constables were laughing. (Then he said) "now go home and take care of your 
-- - women and children. And beware! If any of you dare call a Sinhalese a rowdy. I 
-. am warning you. That is how you start trouble." Then what was there to do? The 
chairman went to his home, my father and I came home and shut the doors and put 
bars against them. Then the rains stopped. 
Then they came. About half an hour later. My father was old and not as strong 
as he used to be. He was not feeling well in his body. But my brother was very 
strong. He was a big man. He was a good soccer player. That was something 
else this Gunasene had against him. He used to play soccer with us. We heard this 
loud noise at a distance. It sounded like one hundred saws were sawing trees at the 
same time. They were shouting something in Sinhalese. Nithi looked out through 
the crack in the front door and told us that there were two navy personnel standing 
on the side of the road. We felt relieved. Our neighbour, she is a Sinhalese 
woman who is married to a Tamil. Her husband works in Anuradhapura He is a 
government servant. He used to come once in two weeks. So this little girl, about 
three years old, used to spend most of her time in our place. This woman treated 
my mother like her own mother and she used to leave this child with us. That day 
this child was with us. And the gang started coming closer and closer. My sister 
and my mother were hiding. Where can they hide? The house has only three 
rooms. They were in the kitchen behind the firewood Then suddenly there was 
silence. AU the shouting stopped. Nitthi looked through the crack in the door and 
the two navy personnel were talking to Gunasene. Then we saw the navy 
personnel leave. My father told my younger brother to bar the two windows. But 
then we heard footsteps in the mud outside. Then they started pushing down the 
door. My father had fallen to the ground My brother was still holding the door. 
But they used crow bars to break it. I ran into the kitchen out of fear. Another 
13"~elam" is the name that Tamil sepamtists have given to their separate nation-state. 
l4  Mr. m g a m  was the head of the Tamil United Liberation Front, which had constitnted in 1975 
of the former (major Tamil) Federal Party and several smaller parries and groups. In its 1976 platform the 
TULF proclaimed the right of self-detembation for the Tamils, even if that were to entail the formation of 
a separate state. In August of 1983, the constitution was amended so as to outlaw parties advocating 
secession. Members of p d a m a t  were required to take an oath of allegiance to the new constitution. The 
elected members of the TUL.F re- and consequently the party was outlawed and the members lost their 
seats in the legislature, leaving the Tamils largely umepresented. 
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gang broke through the kitchen door. They surrounded the house. But the men 
who entered through the kitchen door didn't look for us in the kitchen, they walked 
on into the front room. Then I heard the beating. My mother and sister took the 
child and ran out of the back door into the fields. Then I heard the beating again. I 
slowly stood up and looked through the kitchen door into the front room. Nobody 
saw me. They were looking at the ground. I knew it was my brother on the 
ground. I wanted to help him. There was a knife in the kitchen. I wanted to take it 
and run and cut them all up. But I was a coward. I was afraid My brother would 
have certainly done that for me. (He becomes unconscious. He is laid flat on the 
floor on a mat. A single tear trickles down his cheek. The man who had arranged 
this interview tells me, "The boy can't cry. That is the trouble.") 
(Later): 
Then someone said, "the old man is out there near the well." They looked out 
and laughed. "He is trying to draw water." They said things like that and were 
making fun of him. Some of them moved out, and now I could see my brother. 
They had cut him up. My younger brother had fainted behind the stack of 
firewood. I left him and ran into the field. Someone shouted, "there, over there, 
someone is running." I sat down behind some old tires. I must have fainted. 
When I woke up it was dark. There was smoke coming from where the house was. 
They had set their torches to it. I went looking for my mother and sister in the 
dark. 
Nitthi is sixteen. He believes that he was in school, waiting for the rains to stop, 
when his father and brother were killed and his house was set on fire. Most of the time he 
has total amnesia about the events of that day. There are two exceptions. The first is when 
he wakes up with a start from a nightmare. From the time he wales up he begins to 
describe certain events of that awful day in great and minute detail. And then, as suddenly 
as he has awoken, he falls back onto his mat and falls asleep. In the second typical 
occasion, he too loses consciousness during the day like his brother does, but he then 
wakes up, not into his wakeful amnesia but into detailed recall. The recalling and retelling 
lasts for about five minutes and then he falls asleep. He may sleep for several hours before 
waking up again. What follows is several of Nitthi's accounts taped by his brother for me 
during several episodes. The statements are Nitthi's, but are h w n  from four different 
"dream episodes" and two seq.mrate "post-unconsciousness" episodes. I was asked by the 
family not to play back the tapes to Nitthi. I have, with Selvakumar's help, edited the 
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tapes so as to arrive at a narrative that makes reasonable chronological sense. Apart from 
rearranging the utterances for such a purpose, the editing is limited to omitting the highly 
repetitive utterances (ranging from exclamations such as "Aiyo", to phrases and full 
sentences) and those sounds that made no sense to either Selvakumar or me. In this edited 
version, shifts from utterances drawn from one episode to those drawn from another are 
marked by the first word of the changed episodic utterance being rendered in bold face 
The middle hinge is coming loose. They are pushing the door. Someone is 
kicking the door. Listen. He has put his foot down now. Now he is lifting it out 
of the mud. Now he is kicking the door. Kick, Kick, Kick. Now he is resting 
his foot again in the mud. It is like a paddy field outside. For all the kicking the 
door is not loosening. . . . The bottom hinge is still holding. The screws in the 
top hinge have fallen. The wood is splitting. A crow bar is coming through. It 
appears that father has been poked in the back. He can't breath. He has fallen 
down. My elder brother has turned around and is trying to hold the door back with 
his hands. I see his (Gunasene's) toes from under the door. I know them from 
seeing him play soccer. He has ugly toes. Mud is being squeezed from in between 
his toes. Knives are cutting through the wood of the window. There is smoke 
coming through the window. Gunasene is shouting, "not yet, not yetn (damma 
epa, dQmmQ epa). My brother's leg moving. It is moving like the goat's leg. (He 
is supposed to have witnessed the slaughtering of a goat when he was younger). 
The front door is open and they are going around to the back. They are going to 
the back to kill my father. Look through the door. The two navy men are near the 
dhobi's house (a house at some distance across the main road). My eyes are filling 
with tears. The navy men look like they are very close. I squeeze my eyes. The 
navy men are far away again, near the dhobi's house. Father is crying. "Give me 
some water for my son, Sami. Kill me but give my son some water. Let me give 
my son some water. The son I bore, the son I bore, the son I bore . . ." 
Piyadasa is asking, "how are you going to draw water like this, lying in the mud 
Stand up to draw water from the well; like a man." They are all laughing. 
Karunawathi has come. The tailor boy has come me tailor boy is telling her] 
"they ran to the field with your child They are alright. Don't go. They might 
follow you." They are kicking my father. Karunawathi is shouting , "Leave that 
old man alone. Leave him alone. He is almost dead" "We h o w  your man is a 
Tamil too. And well do the same thing to him if we find him." Karunawathi is 
crying: "What a dreadful shamdtragedy this is" ("mona aparad..de meken). 
Someone is calling the men to the front, They want someone to drag my big 
brother to the road and leave him there. Listen! Karunawathi drawing water fiom 
the well. She tells the tailor boy, "He is dead" 
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I was not able to meet Gunasene. He was in police custody. However, I was able 
to find out two things about him. First, he was not from Nawalapitiya, where I had spent 
part of my childhood, but from a neighboring town called Kotrnale. Second, using a police 
constable as a messenger he had sent Selvakumar Rs.500 and a message, the gist of which 
(according to Selvakumar) was: 
What has happened has happened. Let us forget what has happened. This money 
is for you to rebuild your house. You can stay in our house if you want until you 
finish building your house. 
Social scientists, yours truly included, have tried to understand or even to explain 
communal violence in Sri Lanka The grandest, and in many ways the most admirable, 
attempt so far in this regard is the one recently put forth by Bruce Kapferer. It sought to 
- understand Sinhala against Tamil violence in terms of Sinhala cultural ontology. He 
argued that Sinhala-Buddhist ontology required that it hiemchically encompass and 
dominate a subdued antithesis, in this case the Tamils. Were such a contained antithesis to 
rebel from within it was seen as demonic, and Sinhala Buddhism was called upon to 
exorcise this demon by ritual. The available ritual in the context of ethnic rebellion was 
violence. Such is a rough and shoddy summary of Legends of People, Myths of State . 
The thesis is perfectly Hegelian, except of course for its arrival not at a summum bonum in 
equipoise but in an ontology condemned to violence. The only problem was that, no 
sooner had this and similar theses been put forth, than Tamil violence rose to match 
Sinhala violence. Furthermore, violence was no longer interethnic but intraethnic, with 
more Tamils killing Tamils and Sinhalese killing Sinhalese than Sinhalese killing Tamils or 
Tamils killing Sinhalese. 
I must pause to emphasise here that my description of a violent event in which 
Tamils were victims and Sinhalese the aggressors is fortuitous. Conditions in 1983 and 
1984 when I did fieldwork on this topic yielded more tales of Sinhala on Tamil violence. 
Daniel 
Crushed Glass 
Rest assured that there are plenty of equally gory examples of violence in which the 
Sinhalese were the victims. 
The point is this. Violence is an event in which there is a d excess: an excess 
of passion, an excess of evil. The very attempt to label this excess (as indeed I have done) 
is condemned to fail; it employs what Georges Bataille called "mots glissams" ("slippery 
words"). Even had I rendered faithfully, without any editing, the words--both coherent 
and incoherent--of Nitth., I will not have seized the event. Everything can be m t e d ,  but 
what is narrated is no longer what happened 
- I have also interviewed young men who were members of various militant 
movements and who have killed a fellow human being or human beings with rope, knife, 
pistol, automatic fire or grenade. "You can tell a new recruit from his eyes. Once he kills, 
his eyes change. There is an innocence that is gone. They become focused, intense, like 
in a trance." Such was the account of a veteran militant, who has since left the Movement 
in which he fought. Violence, like ecstasy--and the two at times become one-is an event 
-. that is traumatic, and interpretation is an attempt at mastering that trauma. Such an attempt 
may be made by victim (if he is lucky to be alive), villain or witness. We who are either 
forced or called upon to witness the event's excess either flee in terror or are appeased into 
believing that this excess can be assimilated into culture, made, in a sense, our own. 
Regardless of who the witness is--the villain, the surviving victim, or you and I-the 
violent event persists like crushed glass in one's eyes. The light it generates, rather than 
helping us see, is blinding. Maurice Blanchot, in Madness of the Day writes thus: 
I nearly lost my sight, because someone crushed glass in my eyes. . . I had the 
feeling I was going back into the wall, or straying into a thicket of flint. The 
worst thing was the sudden, shocking cruelty of the day; 1.could not look, but I 
could not help looking. To see was terrifymg, and to stop seeing tore me apart 
from my head to throat. . . .the light was going mad, the brightness had lost all 





Piyadasa (a pseudonym) is a Sinhalese in his late twenties. I knew him as a 
young boy who played soccer in the town of Nawalapitiya, where I grew up. He lived in 
a village near Kotmale and used to ride the bus back and forth to his school with Tamil 
school children who came to Nawalapitiya from the tea estates. At times, after a game of 
soccer, he and his bus-mates would feel so famished that they would pool all their small 
change, including their bus fares, to buy and eat buns and plantains from the local tea 
shop. Then they would start wallcing up the hill to Kotmale, all of six miles. His village 
now lies buried under the still waters of a reservoir built by the Swedes as part of the 
Mahaveli river damming project. 
In 1983, thepanturam (the boy who makes garlands) of the local Hindu temple 
was killed. I was informed by another Sinhala man, a close friend of one of my brothers, 
that Piyadasa was among those who had killed the p~ntamm and that he too had wielded a 
knife. I visited Piyadasa, who has been resettled in the North-central province, and asked 
him to describe to me what had happened. He excluded himself from having directly 
participated in the violence, but was able to give me a detailed account of the event, The 
following are a few excerpts: 
He was hiding in the temple when we got there. The priest, he had run away. 
So they started breaking the gods. This boy, he was hiding behind some god 
We caught him. Pulled him out. So he started begging, " S m i  l5 don't hit. Sami 
don't hit." He had urinated. He pleaded, "Oh gods that you are, why are you 
breaking the sarnis?" They pulled him out to the street. The nurses and orderlies 
were shouting from the hospital balcony. "Kill the Tamils! Kill the Tamils! " No 
one did anything. They all had these long knives and sticks. This boy was in the 
middle of the road. We were all going round and round him. For a long time. 
No one said anything. Then someone flung at him with a sword. Blood started 
gushing (00 gaalaa lee auvaa). Then everyone started to cut him with their knives 
and beat him with their sticks. Someone brought a tire from the Brown and 
Company garage. There was petrol. We thought he was finished. So they piled 
him on the tire and set it aflame. And can you imagine, this fellow stood up with 
15~ami means god. 
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cut up arms and all, and stood like that, for a little while, then fell back into the 
fire. 
The constant shifting from the including "we" to the excluding "they" is 
noteworthy. This was in the early days of my horror-story collecting and I did not know 
what to say. So I asked him a question of absolute irrelevance to the issue at hand. 
Heaven knows why I asked it; I must have desperately wanted to change the subject or 
pretend that we had been talking about something else all along. "What is your goal in life? 
I asked The reply shot right back: 
"I want a V.C.R." 
- . . . 
I have struggled to understand this event, to speak &I# it, and thereby to master it. 
Z : 
But I have literally been struck "speechless." I am not alone, quite clearly. During my - 
work in 1983-84 and since, in Sri Lanka, India, Europe and North America, I have met 
many witnesses of the excess of violence who have been stricken likewise. Shaviro puts it 
22 
eloquently when he describes such a silence as, "not a purity before or beyond speech. It 
;z-- 
does not indicate calm or appeasement. It is rather a violent convulsion, a catastrophe that 
' Y  
overwhelms all sound and all spea2ang. " (199 1:84). 
There are, to be sure, interpretations of such events that friends and "friendly textsn 
offer me, but no sooner than I seize them, they escape the grasp of my understanding. 
There are times when I think that I do understand But, to return in closing to the optic, 
there remains a blind spot in all such understandings, of which GeorgesBataille says: 
There is in understanding a blind spot: which is reminiscent of the 
structure of the eye. In understanding, as in the eye, one can only reveal it 
with difficulty. But whereas the blind spot of the eye is inconsequential, the 
nature of understanding demands that the blind spot within it be more 
meaningful than understanding itself. To the extent that understanding is 
auxiliary to action, the spot within it is as negligible as it is within the eye. 
But to the extent that one views in understanding man himself, by that I mean 
the exploration of the possibilities of being, the spot absorbs one's attention: 
it is no longer the spot that loses itself in knowledge, but knowledge which 
loses itself in it. In this way existence closes the circle, but it couldn't do this 
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without including the night from which it proceeds only in order to enter it 
again. Since it moved from the unknown to the known, it is necessary that it 
inverse itself at the summit and go back to the unknown. (1988: 1 10- 11 1) 
"In this darkness and this silence," there is neither ontology nor epistemology, 
hermeneutics nor semiotic, materialism nor idealism, and most importantly, neither culture 
nor Culture. Herein lies (C/c)ulturels counterpoint, a slippery word in its own right. The 
counterpoint of which Wertheim wrote almost twenty years ago was a counterpoint of hope 
and human emancipation. He described it as a "tiny and apparently futile beginning" which 
had the capacity to "evolve into a powerful stream leading humanity, or part of it, toward 
evolution an4 in more extreme cases, revolution (Wertheim 1974: 1 14). The counterpoint 
of which I have written today is one that resists all evolutionary streams, be they of action 
or of thought. It will and should remain outside of al l  (C/c)ulture, if for no other reasons 
than to remind us that (a) as scholars, intellectuals and interpreters we need to be humble in 
the face of its magnitude, and (b) as hwnan beings we need to summon all the vigilance in 
our command so as to never stray towards it and be swallowed by its vortex into its 
unaccountable abyss. The first is a sobering point that concerns observation, the second is 
a cautionary one that concerns participation: the twin terms that, hyphenated, constitute the 
sine qua non of the anthropological method. It is time for c u l M  anthropology to lose 
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